Picture: Secretariat of State
Interview with Fernando Martínez López
Historian, Spain’s State Secretary for Democratic Memory
Fernando Martínez López is a professor of Modern History in the University of Almería. He dedicated an important part of his research to study the political trials during Francoism and coordinated the mass graves map project in Andalusia. He became general Director for Democratic Memory of the Spanish government in 2019 and Secretary of State in 2020. Last year he dealt with the exhumation of the dictator Francisco Franco from the Valley of the fallen (Valle de los Caídos). He is in charge of developing memory policies in Spain and faces new challenges, such as the debate about a new democratic memory law. We talked to him about the present and the future of memory policies in Spain and Europe.
This is the first time Spain has had a Secretariat of State for Democratic Memory. What are the challenges that lie ahead? What resources and tools will it have?
Indeed, the creation first of a Directorate-General for Historical Memory and then of a Secretariat of State for Democratic Memory, which falls under the Ministry of the Presidency, Relations with the Cortes and Democratic Memory, represents a clear commitment from Pedro Sánchez’s government to protect, disseminate and raise awareness of the processes to build a democratic memory of Spain’s recent past and to recognize those who suffered persecution and violence as a consequence of the Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship.
The main challenge lies in decisively strengthening our country’s democratic memory policies, in line with transnational human rights narratives and practices. In this context, it is first essential to ensure that commemorative processes in Spain become an inescapable part of a common European memory. On a broader level, we must also develop close interfaces with similar processes in Latin America, which can also teach us a great deal. Similarly, at state level, it is vital that national policies be harmonized and coordinated with those being developed by the autonomous communities.
Obviously, each remembrance process has its own unique characteristics, and it is essential not to confuse or mix concepts; however, the globalization of memory can be used as a tool for truth, justice and reparation to establish parallels and affinities and thus enrich our analysis of each process.
With respect to resources, we are currently awaiting budget approval, but the incorporation of this Secretariat of State into the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office will make a difference to the budget allocation.
The draft bill of the Democratic Memory Act, which was approved by the government on 15 September, is intended to serve as a key tool and a guide for fostering democratic memory policy and addressing outstanding issues, thereby remedying the unmet objectives of the 2007 Historical Memory Law, all while taking account of the recommendations of international organizations and the demands of the remembrance movement. Thus, the state’s responsibilities will include exhumations and resignification of the Valley of the Fallen, now that Franco has been removed from his mausoleum.
Compared to the rest of Europe, Spain has a shortage of remembrance museums, interpretation centres and resignified sites that address the country’s traumatic past. Why do you think this is? Do you envisage an active policy to create new spaces for the transmission of memory?
Without a doubt. We plan to start remedying the situation this parliamentary term, but we are aware that it’s long overdue. We know about many initiatives undertaken by the autonomous communities, town councils and also, to a great extent, social and cultural associations to resignify and construct spaces. Under Zapatero, some memorials were financed through government subsidies, but few received direct funding. From now on, the central government will pursue a more proactive policy to create remembrance spaces on a different scale, including local initiatives that are entrenched in the territory and in specific events or experiences. In this regard, it is significant that the general chapter on the Duty of Memory within the draft bill contains, by way of a guarantee of non-recurrence, a specific section on democratic memory sites that will play a commemorative and educational role, and institutional mechanisms will be developed to integrate these into the international networks that respond to similar historical memory construction processes linked to conflicts and human rights violations, especially at European and Latin American level. In particular, the policy aims to safeguard and raise awareness of the extermination or forced labour camps in which thousands of exiles or dissidents were confined, in coordination with the countries where these are located.
Some historians have cited research problems as a result of difficulties gaining access to certain documents (due to the Official Secrets Act, the Data Protection Law or simply understaffed archives). What relationship does the Secretariat have with National Heritage or the State Archives? What role does the Historical Memory Documentary Centre in Salamanca play in this respect?
Within the chapter dedicated to victims’ right to the truth, the draft bill contains a section on archives and documentation, the true written memory of the state, which regulates access to public and private records and archives and specifically mentions the Historical Memory Documentary Centre in Salamanca, in light of the criteria of archival policies in defence of human rights drawn up by UNESCO and the International Council on Archives. In this respect, there are even plans to modify the Official Secrets Act within a year of the entry into force of the Democratic Memory Act. This would guarantee the right of access to the public information contained in all files belonging to the central government in relation to the Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that major progress has been made over the last two years through the ministerial resolutions of 20 September 2018, 30 January 2019 and 22 July 2020, which applied to the historical archives maintained by the Ministry of Defence and allowed the public to access many records relating to the Civil War and the dictatorship, including those marked private or confidential, provided that the corresponding documents date from before 26 April 1968, when the Official Secrets Act came into force, and that there is no real threat to defence or national security.
One of the articles published in this journal addresses the impact of social networks, specifically Twitter, on the exhumation of Francisco Franco. It was a historical event that had the country’s media on high alert. What were the main challenges faced by the Spanish government in relation to the exhumation? Is there any evidence that Mingorrubio Cemetery, where Franco is now buried, has also been turned into a neo-fascist pilgrimage site?
Franco’s exhumation was a triumph for democracy that closed a dark chapter in Spain’s history and brought justice for the victims of the Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship. It’s true that it took place after a great deal of discussion on social networks and in the media. The dictator’s supporters exhausted all possible legal channels, so it fell to the Supreme Court to authorize the decision of Pedro Sánchez’s socialist government and order that the exhumation go ahead in accordance with a mandate from the Congress of Deputies.
Therefore, the main problems have been widely publicized. The Benedictine community of the Valley of the Fallen, Franco’s family, the Francisco Franco National Foundation, the Association for the Defence of the Valley of the Fallen and other far-right groups all radically opposed the move and attempted to block it. This was the main reason for the delay. However, there was a positive side to the problems. They provided a clear picture of the ultra-wing sentiment that can arise when people feel that part of their heritage is under threat, in this case the body of the dictator. An interesting portrait of Spanish society, including politicians, the media and certain institutions, emerged. The facts speak for themselves: the abbot of the Benedictine priory at the Valley of the Fallen declared that he was oblivious to the country’s laws and was willing to defy the order, the dictator’s family used the media to defend his legacy and demand honourable treatment, and those nostalgic for Francoism went to the Valley of the Fallen to show their support for this resistance. The politically charged image of the Franco family, accompanied by the abbot, carrying Franco’s coffin on their shoulders onto the plaza of the Valley of the Fallen in utter solitude also speaks volumes. This image is in stark contrast to those of his burial and shows that, although sociological Francoism is tenacious, support has fallen drastically.
There’s no data to indicate that the new location of Franco’s grave in Mingorrubio is becoming a neo-fascist pilgrimage site. Should that happen, we’ll take whatever legal measures we deem appropriate. In any case, the draft bill stipulates that part of the remit of public administrations is to prevent acts carried out in public that discredit, disparage or humiliate the victims or their families, that glorify the military coup or dictatorship or that pay homage or grant distinctions to any individuals or corporations that supported the military coup and the dictatorship.
One of the big questions relates to the future of the Valley of the Fallen, the great mausoleum where the dictator was buried. What does the government plan to do with the site and how does it intend to address the underlying conflicts (the more than 33,000 people buried there, the Benedictine community that guards the site, resignification of the space, etc.)?
The resignification of the Valley of the Fallen in terms of democratic memory is a priority. We will endeavour to ensure that state policy in this matter is in keeping with the most advanced initiatives in Europe and the rest of the world. We are aware of the complex nature of the task, but we’re not starting from scratch; far from it in fact. Resignification is a long process that started some time ago. A crucial moment came when the process crossed paths with the movement for the recovery of historical memory, especially when attempts were made to exhume the first mass graves in around 2003. These were found empty, and all that was left of the graves were scattered remains. This was the case with an exhumation in Aldeaseca (Ávila) led by Fausto Canales who, in his fight to recover the remains of his father and uncle and through his important public and media presence, has helped shed light on the relocation of the remains of Republicans to crypts in the Valley of the Fallen without the knowledge or permission of their relatives, information that was not in the public domain. This has turned him into one of the key figures in the process to resignify the Valley of the Fallen, together with other individuals and groups who have spent years fighting for the recovery of their relatives’ remains. The fact that there are Republicans in the crypts and that their relatives are demanding that their remains be recovered has put the monument on the radar of the remembrance movement. However, the 2007 Historical Memory Law already included a specific article on the Valley of the Fallen and an additional provision that gave rise to the 2011 Expert Commission, which issued many recommendations and proposed, albeit not unanimously, the exhumation of Franco and advised, this time unanimously, that José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s remains be relocated to a side crypt, thus dismantling the Francoist funeral hierarchy of the monument. When Rajoy was no longer in power and the aforementioned difficulties had finally been overcome, the green light was finally given to exhume Franco. Throughout this process, the Valley of the Fallen has been the subject of public debate and has taken on new layers of meaning that have nothing to do with the arguments of the Benedictine monks and their allies. The new law intends to go one step further: the site will be turned into a civil cemetery to recognize the people buried there and will form the basis for the development of a comprehensive, well-grounded education on the monument, like a kind of set-instone lesson on Francoism, as expressed in its most infamous architecture. This resignification will entail critical and open explanations, interpretations and revelations to override the hegemonic reading of the monument that still prevails.
The government is working on the development of a new democratic memory act. Can you tell us about the main characteristics of this new act? Is there anything that might stop it from being passed by the Congress of Deputies?
Pedro Sánchez’s government has exercised its constitutionally recognized legislative powers to prepare a draft bill for the Democratic Memory Act, whose text was approved by the Council of Ministers on 15 September. The draft bill seeks to recover, protect, disseminate and promote an understanding of democratic memory with a view to fostering cohesion and solidarity between different generations of Spaniards with respect to constitutional principles, values and freedoms. This will ensure that Spanish citizens can effectively exercise their individual and collective right to access information about the events that occurred in relation to the vindication and defence of democratic values and fundamental rights and freedoms in the course of Spain’s contemporary history. Likewise, it reiterates recognition of those who suffered persecution or violence on political, ideological or religious grounds during the Spanish Civil War and the dictatorship, and contemplates complementary measures to remove factors that divide citizens and to promote bonds based on constitutional values, principles and rights.
Key proposals include placing the victims of the Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship at the centre of public action; creating a census of victims; recognizing Spanish women’s active and unique contribution to the struggle for democracy; creating instruments for collaboration and cooperation between regional governments and the participation of citizens and associations to coordinate democratic memory policy; creating a national DNA bank and a Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the events that occurred; promoting the right of access to documentary archives; creating provisions for the reparation of victims; incorporating democratic memory into the Spanish education system; declaring democratic memorial sites, with a particular focus on the resignification of the Valley of the Fallen; adopting measures to prevent glorification of the Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship by removing symbols and elements opposed to democratic memory, as well as distinctions, titles and decorations awarded to the protagonists or promoters of the uprising, the Civil War or the dictatorship; and establishing a penalty system to ensure compliance with the law.
Victims of the Franco regime and many of their relatives had to turn to another country, Argentina, to seek justice and reparation. The United Nations has pointed out the stumbling block posed by the Amnesty Law passed in October 1977 during the transition to democracy in the investigation of the crimes of the Franco regime. Do you think this law should be repealed or some kind of commission created to investigate the crimes of the dictatorship, as Spanish remembrance associations are demanding?
The law does not provide for the repeal of the 1977 Amnesty Law. We can still remember a time during the late-Franco period when we’d go out into the streets and shout, “Freedom, amnesty and statute of autonomy!” Renowned Spanish legal experts argue that the 1977 Amnesty Law “is more cited than read” and understand that it is intended for political crimes rather than genocidal acts and crimes against humanity. It is important to keep in mind that Spain had ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights just months before the Amnesty Law came into force. It should be noted that the draft bill for the Democratic Memory Act expressly stipulates that, in accordance with Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution, the public authorities shall interpret that law in accordance with international human rights treaties ratified by Spain, without prejudice to its direct application where appropriate. It also stipulates that the state will guarantee the right to investigate the human rights and international humanitarian law violations that occurred during the Civil War and the dictatorship, as well as during the period between the dictator’s death and the approval of the Spanish Constitution, and will create, to that end, a Democratic Memory and Human Rights Prosecutor’s Office, whose role will be to promote the search for victims of the events under investigation with a view to properly identifying and locating them. I think it is important to highlight the fact that the new public prosecutor has decided to expressly revoke the order issued in 2016, which hindered the investigations carried out by Judge María Servini in Argentina.
At the time of writing, a trial is under way relating to Pazo de Meirás, one of the dictator’s summer residences. The Franco family wants to sell it, despite questions over ownership. Meanwhile, the Francisco Franco National Foundation continues to retain documentation and make apologies for the dictator. How can we fight against these anti-democratic actions?
The Solicitor General of the State quite rightly defended the public nature of Pazo de Meirás in court and demanded that it be returned to the state. The judge ruled that the Franco family must give up the property. With respect to the other questions, the answer is clear and outlined in the draft bill: Franco apologism and the direct or indirect incitement to hatred or violence against the victims of the Civil War or Francoism, based on their status as victims, run counter to the public’s interest. And, as you know, the law states that failure by a foundation to pursue aims of general interest constitute grounds for dissolution
What is your opinion of the memory policies and programmes promoted by EU institutions? What are their main challenges?
One of our priorities is to link Spanish memory policies much more closely to those of Europe. Above all, we must explicitly state that to commemorate Spain and its regions is, without question, to commemorate Europe. For example, part of the resignification of the Valley of the Fallen involves recognizing it as a European monument that can be compared and contrasted with architecture designed during other European fascist movements, such as those that took place in Italy and Germany. Obviously, every architectural structure used as political propaganda is idiosyncratic and must be interpreted “inwardly”. However, they are still paradigmatic expressions of the social, political and ideological movements that emerged throughout Europe in the first half of the 20th century and can therefore also be interpreted in a transnational context.
That said, the challenge lies in knowing the extent to which genuinely European memory policies can be implemented or whether, as is so often the case, they are an unequal and sometimes contradictory sum of a set of national policies.
In September 2019, coinciding with the 80th anniversary of the start of the Second World War, the European Parliament passed a resolution that equated Nazism with communism (2019/2819 RSP), which caused quite a stir among both European and Spanish commemorative entities. What do you think of this persistent view, which is usually promoted by conservative political parties and Eastern European entities and institutions?
In my opinion it’s a fallacy. It’s an argument used mostly by Eastern European countries to whitewash the collusion of elites and much of the population with totalitarian regimes on both sides, while allowing them to portray themselves as the victims. It is important for researchers (and, don’t forget, I’m a historian) not to confuse certain social, political and ideological processes with others. The political practice of categorizing Nazism and communism under the common umbrella of “totalitarianism” obscures and hinders one’s understanding of the nature of the appalling events of 20th-century Europe, whether they be death camps, genocides or gulags. Obviously, it has political potential as a populist simplification, but we cannot be guided by those parameters.
What weight do state administrations – in this case, the Spanish government – carry with the institutions responsible for the politics of remembrance in the European Union, and what is the relationship between them like?
It is clear that it must be strengthened from an institutional standpoint, especially given the Europeanist perspective of our approach to promoting democratic memory. We have EUROM and other specialist organizations to achieve this. Having said that, we also consider it important to develop
stable cooperative relationships with remembrance institutions in Latin American countries. These relationships are already being built in the case of Argentina and Chile, with the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, for example.
One of the democratic threats currently facing Spain and the European Union is the growing influence of the extreme right. What role should public memory policies play and what specific measures do you think should be taken to combat this threat in Europe and Spain?
Public memory policies must help act as a dam against the rise of the extreme right in Europe. Well-informed, critical citizens who are aware of the tragedies of the past, who are open to differences and reject essentialism, cannot accept these neofascist messages. But we mustn’t be naive. Decades of democratic memory policies in Europe, the transnational hegemony of cosmopolitan memories linked to the Holocaust and mass violence, and the ethical triumph of the “never again” paradigm – perhaps more fragile than we ever realized – have not yet succeeded in stemming this tide. Because of new information flows on social media, the enormous ease with which information overload occurs and the spread of fake news, often promoted by governments themselves, we now find ourselves in new and extraordinarily complex circumstances. We have no choice but to adapt. Although there are no single solutions or actions and this undeniable surge is forcing us to critically rethink the preventive measures developed in recent decades, we cannot afford to do away with strengthening education on human rights and democratic memory; quite the opposite, in fact. Perhaps the first task is to thoroughly rethink the tools used to design education programmes, the formats used to express them, the languages used to convey them and the target audiences, since the most classical formulas are clearly not working anymore.